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IN TI-IE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROSE KLAFT.A,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Ys.

ALBERT N.
RANCH,

S~lITH,

dba OX

l
Case No.
( 10275

)

Dcfe11dr111f r11ul AJJpellr111t.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

PRELIMIN.ARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as in the court below.
All italics are ours.

FACTS
It was undisputed that the Black Angus cow in
question \\ ns owned by defendant, and that it had falleu
011
t of tlte baC'k end of defendant\ truck while in

transit. The reason wa~ that the back e11d of th~ ruck
had somehow opened at the corner. Trooper Neil ~.
Bishop testified as to a cmn-ersation with defendant :it
the scene of the accident (It 19) :
"\Vell, he explaiued aboul traveliug 01: ea 1r
and a car causing him to lune his attention di·
rected to the rear of his truck, or at least to some
concern for his unit, that caused him to .-;top a1 1il
inspect his trnck, and he <lid fiud that thn·e 11 a1
eattle missiug, and that there was an opeu111g
in the coruer; that he was very coneerned, he 11110
his boy both. They t11rned around. They fastened
the corner and turned around aml came back tu
locate and help with what may have occmred.

Q. In regard to the ownership of this black cmr
that you observed off the road. did you talk '
to him about that?

.A. Yes. Three years of this is a little 1 ague. I
do recall that he said it was his, and that he
was on his way to Ogden from his ranch 111
Nevada."

The accident happened on the main highway be·
tween Salt Lake City and ,;v endover, l' tah, approxi·
ma tely 4<3 miles east of
en dover ( R 12) . Trooper
Bishop described the highway as "what we call black·
top highway." He also stated (R. 14):

"r

"Yes, it would be dark. It has been chipped
which helps reflect some light. It isn't liken 11111
of your new-laid hot mix, which tenlls to ahsor 11
mo~t all of your headli1zhts. There woulri hnrc
'
''
.
~
f'CT
been some reflection from the ch1ppeu sur a
· The
that would be-that \Vas there at the tnne.
main color, of course, would he dark"

!

The color of the highway was described by plaintiff
as "the highway seemed awful dark, too" ( R. 45). The
black cow appeared to Hichard Klafta, plaintiff's son
rn<l the driver of the automobile, as a black object that
Jouked like part of the highway ( R. 75). The cow was
described as black by the various witnesses who later
arrired at the scene ....After the accident, Richard Klafta
discorered the Cox automobile which had previously hit
the cow ( R. Ti'). It was on the left-hand side of the
higlnrar, facing west. with the left side of the car completely off the road, and "maybe the right front and
nght rear tire could haYe been on the road," with the
hea<llighis and taillights off. Trooper Bishop examined
the Cox ,-ehicle and testified that contact had been lost
11ith the battery so that the headlights and taillights
11m not fonctiouing ( R. 4-1).
Richard l~lat'ta had dri,·en the automobile in question from Cicero, Illiuois, pursuant to an agreement
he had entered into "ith Cathay's Drive-A-,Vay that
he was tu driYe the automobile to Sacramento in ex<'hange for the ride ( H. 71, 72). His mother and father
made the trip to haYe a final visit with their son before
he went nYerseas on duty with the Army. Richard
testified that immediately prior to the accident he was
trareliug approximately .50 miles per hour (R. 75). He
testified that lw and his parents left the U nexcelled
Hrstauraut at sundown and drove continuously to the
icene of tlw aeeident ( H. H) . The accident happened
:it fi:il:J p.rn. to () :35 p.111. ( R. 75). Defendant prove<l by
Exhibit n ( R. 129) that 011 the night in question sun-

down was at 5 :08 p.m. at Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant testified that the distance from the c·uexcellcd
Restaurant to the scene of the accident is 65 miles, wit/ 1
the only restricted speed area being Grantsville, whieh ,
is 4 miles in length, with a BO-miles-per-hour speed li1Uit.
.Mathematical calculation reveals without dispute that
Richard drove a distance of 65 miles, includiug .J< mi!e.1
of a restricted speed zone area, in from one hour and ~5
minutes to one hour and '27 minutes. Richard testified
that prior to the accident, he had dimmed his lights on
account of headlights appearing in the distance; that all
of a sudden, he noticed the black cow which had the
appearance of a black tarpaulin on the highway aud
immediately hit the brakes ( R. 7 5, 76). The investiga·
tion of Trooper Bishop showed 9 feet 8 inches of skirl
marks prior to impact.
Donald E. Green, a P.I..E.. driver, produced b)·
defendant as a witness, described seeing the Klafta head·
lights when he was possibly two to three hundred yards
away and observed the lights suddenly jump into the
air three or four feet and then violently swene to thP
right side of the highway (R. 120, 121).
Implicit in this testimony is the fact that Green did
not see what made the headlights jump.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TIUAL COURT PROPERLY ORDEHED A NE\Y TIUAL ON DAMAGES
OXLY.
A. AS A MATTER OF LAW DEFENDANT VIOLATED
SECTION 27-1-33, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.

The court submitted a special verdict for the jury
to an,wer, and the jury answered as follows:
"\\' c the jury tind from a preponderance of
the e\·idence in this case the following answers
to questions propounded to us:
l.

Did the defrnd:rnt Yiolate the statute here in
question by failing to properly secure the livestock to prevent their escape?
Answer: (Yes or no) No.

:.!.

\\'as the defendant's violation of the statute
a proximate cause of the plaintiff's ll1JUries
and damage~
Awmel': (Yes or no) Yes.

a. \Vhat amount of damages, if any, do you find
the plaintiff is entitled to as reasonable compensation for her injmies and damage?
Special $1,333.96.
General $ None.
-!. Was the driver. Richard Klafta, guilty of neg-

ligence immediate}~· prior to the collision here
in question?
An~w<'r:

(Yes or no) Yes.

5. 'Vas the. negligence of Richard Klafta !lit
sole proximate cause of the collision?

Answer: (Yes or uo) No.
Dated and signed this 16th day of De1.:ember,
1964.
1
. s/ Donald 'V. N ortl:
.Jury Foremau"
Plaintiff requested the court to instruct the jury a1
a matter of law that defendant was responsible to plain·
tiff in damages and therefore that the only issue for the
jury to decide was the issue of damages (see Requested
Instruction No. 2). In the alternati,·e, plaintiff requestrd
the court to instruct the jury as a matter of la1r that
defendant violated Sections 27-1-33 and 27-1-34, Vtah
Code Annotated, 1953, in allowing cattle to fall from
his truck; and that if the jury found from a preponder·
ance of the evidence that said violation proximate!)
caused damages to plaintiff, then the jury should find
the issues in favor of plaintiff and against defendant
and assess damages in accordance with the instrnctions
(see Requested Instruction No. 3) .
The court ref used both of these requests and sub·
mitted the case to the jury on the question as to whether
or not the defendant had violated the aforesaid statutes;
and if so, whether or not said violation proximate])·
caused damages to the plaintiff. (See Instructions 8
and 9.) In addition, the court submitted to the j tll')' tht
question as to whether or not Richard IOafta "as guilt)
of negligence and whether or not said negligence. if anr

"a' tile ~ok proxinwte cause of plaintiff's injuries awl
d:unages (see l 11structiou No. I 0) .
,After the n:r<liet had beeu ordered entered, plaintiff
11101 e<l the court for a judgment N .0. V ., and a new
trial on the damage issue alone, and the court entered
Ilic folloll'ing order 011 December 3, 1964:
'"ln this matter the evidence shows without
dispute that tlie animal inrnked in the collision
here in questiou had escaped from the vehicle
of the defendant.-;. The court is of the opinion
that Section :27-1-33, C.C.A., 1953, was violated
by the escape of the animal in question. Under
the pro,·isions of Section 27-1-34, U.C.A., 1953,
tlw plaiutiff is entitled to recoYer her damages.
The motion of the plaintiff for judgment notwithstanding the ,·erdict is granted.
"A nc\\· trial is granted on the issue of plaintiff\ damages."

111 plaintiffs argument IJefore the trial judge, plaintiff assertetl that the jury should not have been given
the (1uestio11 of whether or not defendant violated the
statute. inasmuch as according to the undisputed evidence. Jefenda11t violated said statute; that in addition,
as a matter of law, the ,·iolation of the statute was a
proximate cause of injuries to plaintiff and therefore
the only proper issue for the jury was that of damages.
The eourt agreed with plaintiff's contentions.
lt should be pointed out that the interrogatories on
li:t!1ility were all answered favorably to plaintiff except
for the first one where the jury· stated that there was

..,I

no statutory violation. ln the question appeared llit
words "properly secure the livestock." These arc not
the words of the statute. The words of the statute are:
"So ... loaded as to prevent its contents from dropping
... etc." The incorrect language in the iuterrogatorr
no doubt accounts for the answer which is. of cours;.
contrary to the undisputed evidence that Smit!i\ cm:
fell from his truck. The answer that the violation of the
statute proximately caused the plaintiff's inj my is correct and the only proper answer in view of the undisputed evidence. The answer that Richard Klafta 11as
negligent is disputable, but that answer becomes w1important in ,·iew of the answer that said negligence
was not the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.
The answers on damages were improper because of
failure to assess general damages, even though it was
undisputed that plaintiff had suffered a fractured back.
It is clear that under these circumstances, the trial court
could best correct the situatiou by using its authority
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by granting
judgment for plaintiff N.0.V. and a new trial on
damages only. (See Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

1

Rule 59.)
Section ~7-1-33, Utah Corle Annotated, l!l5a, reads
as follows:
" (a) No vehicle shall be driven or moved on any

i

highway unless such vehicle is so construct· '
eel or loaded as to prevent its content~ from
droppiny, sifting, leaking, or othm1se es·
cnpiny therefrom. except that sand 01

s

other abrasin:s mar UC dropped for the
purpose of securing traction or water or
other suustance may be sprinkled 011 a
rnadway iu cleaning or maintaining such
roadway .
.. ( b) No person shall operate on the highway
any vehicle ,,·ith any load unless said load
and any coYeriug thereon is suitably fasteued, scrnred and confined according to
the nature of such load so as to prevent
said covering or load from becoming loose,
detached, or in an.lJ manner a hazard to
other users oi' the highway. (Italics ours).
The language of the aforesaid statute is mandatory
:•nd all-indusiYe. The statute simply provides that no
rebide will be driveu on a highway in the State of Utah
unless its load is secured so as to prevent any dropping
lll' escaping of the contents, and further that no person
.1hall operate a vehicle unless the load is secured and
tonfined so as to prevent a hazard to users of the high11ar Obviously the legislature of the State of Utah had
111 mind the wry danger which existed in this case of
trarelers ou the highway being injured as a result of
dropped objects. Defendaut argues that he should be
permitted to excuse himself from his violation of this
1tatute by showing what a careful person he is and hm.,.·
frequently he inspected his load and ~·hat a sturdy truck
and rac:k he operated. No such excuse is available to the
i defendant, whether it be in a suit for damages or a
trimi11al prosecution. This type of statute is what is
termed in eriminal law a police regulation. It is stated
111 Rurrli('k Law of Crime. Yol. I, page 166:
9

"The legislature may deem certain acts although not ordinarily criminal i11 themselres
harmful to public safety, health, morals, a:Hl th;
general welfare, awl by ,·irtue of its police .IJOll'er
may absolutely prohibit them, either expresslr.
or impliedly by omitting all references to ~u~h
terms as 'knowingly,' 'wilfully,' 'i11tentio11alh-:
and the like. Su eh statutes are in the nature '11 r
police regulations, aud it is well establishe1l that
the legislature may, for the protection of all
the people, punish their violation without regard
to the question of guilty knowledge. Among the
illustrations of such statutes are selling adulterated or impure food and milk; selling intoxi·
eating liquors to minors; selling narcotics and
other harmful drugs; selling oleomargarine for
butter; removing timber from school lands; public officers expending public money in excess of
appropriation; possession of automobile with
serial number removed; and manv forms of traffic laws.
·

"It is of ten said bv the courts in connection
with these cases that the legislature may provide
a penalty for the doing of a particular act 're·
gardless of the lack of any criminal intent.' But
rnluntary action is present in all punisha_ble
offenses, and the true explanation for holdmg
responsible violators of the statutes we are now
considering is that the legislature, for the protec·
tion of the public, intended that ignorance of the
fact or state of thin(}' conkmplaterl hv the stntute
should be no excuse~ The legisl:iture ·makes it th~
duty of the individual to know the facts, and '.!
he acts without such knowledge he does so at.hrs
own risk. His neglect to ascertain the f:irts fur·
nishes all the 'intent' the law requires."
10

Burdick, Law of Crime, Vol. I, Page 240:
"The legislature, by virtue of its police power
may absolutely prohibit certain acts <leerned
harmful to public safety, health, morals, and the
ge11eral welfare. Such acts are, largely, in the
i1ature of police regulations, and the acts prohibited are of tell called 'public welfare otfenses.'
Sul.'.h terms a.~ 'knowingly,' 'intentionally,' 'wilfully,' are usuall:1· omitted from these statutes,
and it is generally held that since such laws are
passed for the protection of the public, the legislature intended that ignorance of the fact mentio11ecl bv the statute <>houlcl be no defense. It is
tlw dut,: of the iudiYidual to know the facts, and
his 11eg leet to ascertain the facts, if he violates
the law, fumishe'i all the intent the law requires.
Couspicuous ;imong these statutes are various
motor-Yehicle awl other traffic acts; pure food
regulations; and l ir1 uor and anti-narcotic acts."
0

This ('omt has already accepted the doctrine of
:1Lsolule liability in the fields of statutory Yiolation in
adulleratcd foods and the storing of explosiYes. In the

ease of Xicmr11111 «.Grand Central Markets,Inc., 9 U.2d
JU, 837 P.:!d J:!J, this court held that violation of the
:Hlulteratcd food statutes in selling ground beef with
trichinae treated absolute liability and stated at page 51:
.. Prior interpretations of this type statute ha Ye
stated that ciYil l iabilit\· is based 011 the same
c:lements as criminal liabilitv and mav be based
simplr on proof of Yiolatir;n of sucl; a statute
a1ul violation ma~· re.-;ult e\·e11 though there be no
kilo\\ kclgc of tlie food's harmful propensities 011
tl1c part uf those responsible for its sale."
11

And again at page .52:
"Evidence was receiYed in the court below of
the car~ taken to avoid ~he mixing of grouuJ
pork with ground beef m the preparation of
hamburger. This was admissible to show that
there was no such mixing. But if there was in fact
such a mixing, then under the statute the defendant is liable. The purpose and eff e<.:t of the in·
struction was to point out to the jury thi~ fact
and to make it clear that the evidence of great
care in the preparation of these products was ad·
missible only to show that the food was in fad
not adulterated, and that it should not be considered by the jury so as to exonerate the defendant from liability on the ground of due care."
This court in effect applied the doctrine of absolute
liability in regard to violation of statutes regulating the
storage of explosives in the cases of Skerl v. Willow
Creek Coal Co., ( 1937) 92 U.474, 69 P.2d .502, and
Smith v. Mine~ Smelter Supply Co., (1907) 82 U.21,
88 P. 683.
B. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER PURSUANT
TO SECTION 27-1-34, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.

Defendant in his brief is attempting to argue the
concept of negligence in this case by twisting plaintiffs
argument around and making it appear that plaintilt
is contending that a violation of the statute is negligence
per se. This is not our position. The negligence concept
is not applicable in the case at bar. Violation of the
statute proximately causing damages to plaiutiff estnli-

12

lishes liability pursuant to the specific terms of Sectio11
~i-1-34, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The case at bar
iseren stronger than the Niemann case, inasmuch as we
need look 110 further than the terms of the statute itself
to Jind legislative intent to establish absolute liability.
Section i7-l-34, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads as
follows:

"Any person ,-iolating any of the provisions
of this chapter '*"'H• shall be liable for all damages
that may accrue to the party damaged by reason
of such violation."
It is difficult to see how anything could be more

dear thau that the legislature established absolute liability for breach of the statute in question.
According to the clear terms of Sections 27 -1-33
and ~7-1-34, it was improper for the court to have given
the jury the question of whether or not defendant violated the statute. Defendant admitted that his cow fell
out of the spaee between the tailgate and the side of
the rack on his truck. Therefore, his violation was
established. It was improper to invite the jury to struggle over the question of whether or not the def end ant
iiolated the statute by "failing to properly secure the
liYestoek to prevent their escape." The cow was not
secured under the statute because the undisputed evirlenee reYealed that the cow was not prevented from
·.··dropping ... or otherwise escaping ... " from the
truek. The word "properly" placed in the court's in'1ructions injected a negligence concept not contained

13

in the statute. This is the reason the trial court enlenrl /
judgment for plaintiff N.O. \'.,and the primar~' reason
defendant\; intermediate appeal must fail.

1

POINT II

IN VIE\\' OF THE FACT THAT PLAl:i- :
TIFF IS ENTITLED TO A DIRECTED
VERDICT ON LIABILITY AND A XE\\
TRIAL ON DA.MAGES ONLY, THE OTHER
POINTS RAISED BY DEFENDANT IN HIS
BRIEF ARE vVITHOUT MERIT.
Before addressing ourseh-es to the individual points
raised in defendant's brief, we point out that any error>
in submission of the liability issue to the jury, in order
to have a bearing on this petition, must have been pre
j udieial. There could be no prejudice here berause of
the overriding fact that plaintiff was entitled to a
directed verdict under the mandatory provisions of the
Ctah Statutes and the fact that the prone emr in the
road clearly and as a matter of law was at least one uf
the proximate causes of the accident.
OF DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT RICHARD KLAFTA'S
CONDUCT COULD HAVE BEEN A SUPERSEDING OR THE
SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.

The case of Nyman v. Cedar City, ( 1961) 12 l'2<l
±.5, :Jo 1 P .2d ll 14, should dispose of defendant's clnini
that negligence of Richard Klafta was the sole proxi·

atc cause of plaintitf's injuries. The court at page 50,
iu dealing with the question of whether or not the later
of the driver was the sole proximate cause
11 e1l'Jio·ence
I'> I'>
instead of a concurring cause, states:
111

"A circumstance or a force which can reasonably be regarded as the effective factor in producing au injury can properly be regarded as a
proximate cause of it. And this is so even though
later events which combined to cause the injury
may also be classified as negligent so long as the
later act is something which might reasonably
be expected to follow in the natural sequence of
events. (Citing Hillyard v. Utah By-Products
Co., I U.2d 143, 263 P.2d 287.)
"\Ve are in accord with the idea that where
there is a negligently created condition (such as
this obstruction) and a later negligent actor (such
as the driver) obse1Te<l, or the circumstances are
sucl1 that he could not fail to observe such obstrnction, that he nevertheless ran into it, the
later negligenee of the driver would be an independent, inte1Tening, efficient cause, and therefore the sole proximate cause of the accident.
This i.~ based 011 the reasoning that generally
it is not reasonabh· to be foreseen that one who
becomes aware of~; danger in ample time to avoid
it will fail to do so.
"But a different principle applies if the later
actor (the driwr ~Talton), even though acting
negligently, did not become aware of the danger
until too late to amid striking the obstruction.
After getting into such an emergency situation,
his aetion in dri\·ing into the obstruction could be
regarded as acting in combination with the prior

15

negligence of the city as a coucurriug pruxi 11 wte
cause of the accident. In that event, his act would
not be the sole proximate cause. Jt is reasoned
that this is so because the condition of danger
created by the city is such that it could rcasonablr
be anticipated that travelers on the street. ne•,,Ji.
gent or otherwise, may not observe the danger~ 111
condition until too late to ~n-oid it. Therefore. ;111
accident of the character here under consideratio11
might be expected to follow as a natural co11Sequence of the dangerous eondition preriouslr
created, and consequently may be deemed to b~
proximately caused by it. The evidence here is
reasonably susceptible of the vie\\' that the driver
was unable to see the obstructiou uutil too latr
to amid it. In fact, that is the import of tlw plaintiff's evidence and the theory upon which the
trial court rendered its judgment."

1

Plaintiff's evidence in the case at bar, ju'il as i11 1
the Nyman case, showed that the driver was unable to ,
see the carcass in time to avoid hitting it. There is 1111
evidence whatsoever that he observed or that he could
not fail to observe such obstruction but ne,·erthclcss ran
into it. Accordingly, any negligence on the part of Rich·
ard Klafta could be no more than a concurring cause
and therefore the defense of sole proximate cause does
not apply.
Defendant's violation of the statute is a proximak
eatfse of the injuries suffered by plaintiff. The rery
danger that the statute guards against, the danger 111
other motorists, occasioned by the dropping of ob,iecli
on the highway, caused the accident in question.

16

OF DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE PLEADINCS
ALLEGING CAUSAL NEGLECT ON COX'S PART SHOULD
HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED IN EVIDENCE OR MENTIONED
IN THE INSTRUCTIONS.

Counsel for plaintiff did not allege in the complaint that Cox's conduet was the sole proximate cause
of the accident. On the contrary, the complaint alleged
that both the conduct of Cox and the conduct of Smith
proximately caused the accident. The burden was 011
defendant Smith to prove his contention that Cox's
conduct was a superseding cause. He came forward
ll'ith no eYidence on the point. There was no evidence
as to how long a time elapsed between the Cox incident
and the Klafta incident. Defendant must take the bitter
1rith the sweet. If the complaint is to be taken as evidence, it is to the effect that two causes, that of Smith
and that of Cox proxi11.ately caused the accident. As a
matter of fact, the pleadings were properly kept from
the jury as e,·idence. Cox was never served, and his case
was ne,·er before the court.

As to what is a superseding cause that will relieve
awrongdoer of liability, Prosser on Torts, Second Edition, at page 267, states:
"The question ahrnys is whether he is to be
relie,·ed of responsibility, and his liability superseded, b~· the subsequent event. In general this
has been determined by asking whether the intervention of the other cause was a significant part
of the hazard inYoh·ed in the defendant's conduct,
or was reasonably eonnected with it. Sometimes
1.'."

the limita tio11 has been treated as one of for._

~eeability; but it can scarcely be so defined. siii~e
m many cases recovery has been allowed where
the intervening cause was not one whieh anr
reasona~le a~tor coul? !>e expected to auticipat;
or have m mmd, but it 1s regarded as 'normal' to
the situation he has in fact created. The pr~1ctitil',
application of the distinctiou 11ndoubted!r 1i,11
involved a considerable element of hindsight.

Prosser also states at page 268:
"Obviously the defendant cauuot be reliered
from liability by the fact that the risk, or part of
the risk, to which he has subjected the plaintiff
has come to pass. Foreseeable intervening form
are within the scope of the original risk, and hence
of the defendant's negligence. The courts are
quite generally agreed that such intenening
causes will not supersede his responsibilit('
(Citing cases.)
Prosser also discusses so-called "normal" iuterrening causes in situations where the plaintiff could not
reasonably foresee the intervening cause, but sueh rause
is normal to the risk created and therefore not a superseding cause. At page 270 in Prosser on Torts. the
following appears:
"There are other intervening cnuses which :
could scarcely have beeu contemplated by the ,
defendant at the time of his conduct, but wh1cl1
are nevertheless to be regarded as normal incidents of the risk he has created. 'Vhen the defeud·
ant negliaently drives an automobile. he mn)
reasonabl~ for~see that he may run dmrn '1 1n:111
1
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or collide with another car. It would be straining
anticipation to the hreaking point to say that he
should ha Ye in mind the possibility that the man
might he left unconscious iu the highway, an<l
ruu over by another car, or that the automobile
might be left across the highway and cause a
seeon<l collision. He might have even less reason
to contemplate the possibility that if he enda11gered a child. a rescuer dashing out from the
sidewalk might be injured. But such events are
eertainh· not abnormal incidents of the situation
in fact. created - the unconscious man, the
bloekcd highwa~·. or the danger to the child. ***
They are closelr and reasonably associated with
tk immediate c:onsequences of the defendant's
act. and to that extent may be regarded as within
the scope of the risk created. For the most part
the~· luffe been e:1 lied foreseeable by the courts."
In discussiug foreseeable results of unforeseeable
1·a11ses, the following appears at page 278 in Prosser on
Torts:
"Suppose that the defendant is negligent because his conduct threatens a result of a particular kind which will injure the plaintiff, and an
interYe11ing cause which could not be anticipated
changes the situation, but ultimately produces
the same result? The problem is well illustr~ted
by a well-known federal case. (Johnson v.
Kosmos Portland Cement Co., 6 Cir. 1933, 64
F.:!d 193). The defendant failed to clean the residue out of an oil barge, tied to a dock, leaving
it full of explosive gas. This was of course negligence, since tire or explosion, resulting in harm
to any person in the vicinity was to be anticipated
from any one ot' several possible sources. A bolt
nf lightning struek the barge, exploded the gas,
l 'J

an<l injured workmen on the premises. 'j'\ 11
defendant was held liahle. If it be assumed tlw
the lightning was an unforeseeable iuterrn1j11 ,,
cause, still the result itself was to he anticipate,[
and the risk of it imposed upon the <lefendam
the original rluty to use proper care .
. "In such a cas:. the ~·esult is '~ithi11 .the seup:
of the defendants negligence. His obliga[io1 11
the plaintiff was to protect him against tlie ml
of such an accident. It is only a slight extension ·
of his responsibilit~· to hol<l him liable when t\11 1
danger he has crea te<l is realized through extenwi
factors which coulrl not be anticipated. An 1 1
stinctive feeling of justice leads to the eondusi111 ·
that the defendant is morally responsible in suci, ·
a case, and that the loss should fall upon hun
rather than upon the innocent plaintiff."
11

·''r·

The case of Wedel v. Johnson, et al, 1936 Minn
496 Minn. 170, 264 N
G89, is a case with a simila1
fact situation. In this case plaintiff sought to recorn
for injuries sustained while driving his car on the l11gl1
way at night when he collided with the carcass of a hoN
It appeared the horse running at large on the highwa.1 .
had been struck by a truck. The sheriff was notified ut •
the presence of the carcass in the roadway,
but befon'I
•
he had an opportunity to remove it, the accident imoh i
ing plaintiff's car occurred. Plaintiff brought at:l1nn '.
against the driver of the truck that killed the hor't
against the owners of the truck who had permitted tht:
driYer to use it for his own purposes, and against tlit
owner of the horse, alleging violation of the statu!c
against allowing animals to run at large, and negligenrt'
1

1

1
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iii permitting the horse to escape from its enclosure.
Trial resulted iu a verdict for the plaintiff against all
defendants. The defendants moved for judgment not11ithstancling the yerdict, or a new trial, and plaintiff
.,1 111 rnovecl for a new trial on the ground of inadequate
damages. Defendant's motions were denied, but plain1·1ff was granted a new trial on the issue of damages
done. The appellate court ultimately absolved all defendants except the horse owner and in regard to the
horse owner's liability stated:

"Without going into the evidence in detail***
a careful examiuation of the record discloses that
the jury might well find that (defendant's) employees in charge of the horses at the fairgrounds,
carelessly allowed them to escape and neglected
to properly return them to control, and we think
that under modern traffic conditions the jury
might well find that a man of ordinary prudence
would anticipate injury to some one from allowing horses at large in the vicinity of highways.
This would be particularly true at night. It does
not greatly alter the situation that the horse was
struck uu the highway by some other car. Such
cullision would not be an efficient intervening
1·a11se which would relieve (defendant) of liabilit,y.
The body of the horse aliYe or dead was a menace
to the highway traffic, and allowing the animal
to run at large was a substantial factor and a
material contribution to plaintiff's injury."
'''

The conduct of Cox, whether negligent or not, un-

rler the foregoing authorities could not be a superseding
t: i·ause for the reason that the accident involving plaintiff
1
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is the \·ery antieipatable result whieh moliYa ted tJ 1e itgi
lature in enacting the statute.
The foregoing arg1111H::11t should not be taken :1111
admission on plaintiff's part that the eomplaint 1 ,,~
admissible as a ju<lieial admission. \Ve deny that 111 ,
is the case. On its face the eomplaint eo11trorert.1 I!
eontention of defendant. The complaint alleges i1111"
first cause of action that the negligence of Smith·
proximately caused the injuries ... of which plaiuliii
herein complains ... " The second ea use of action allegn
Cox's negligenee " ... proximately caused the injur1t1
. . . " And in the prayer plaintiff "prays judgmt11:
against defendants and eaeh of them ... "
Certainly the foregoing pleading could 11ot oe t:rkf 1
as an admission that Cox's negligence supersede:
Smith's negligence.
1
,

In addition, it is settled law in Utah that an a11s11t1
or other pleading which has not been superseded Ii)· a:
amendment or substitution cannot be used as eride11r•
for the jury by way of admissions without the consc11t
of the parties; the effect and meaning of the plea<linµ·
with respect to admissions being a question for the eourt
See Toone v .•J. P. O'Neil Construction Co., ~o C.2fi.i
121 P.10.
OF DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT ROSE KLAFTA WAI
HERSELF GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

There are two reasons why contributory neglig~nce
·
·
·m t I1e case at liar · Fll'st.
was not a proper .Jury
issue
71

thi' 1rn.'i uol a ueglige11ec t'.asc. It was a statutory liability
case. Conlributury ucglige11cc is 11ot a defense.

Secoud, the evi<lu1cc does not reveal any act or
omission 011 the part of llosc Klafta that could under
am· stretch of imaginati011 be characterized as neglig·eure. The plaintiff testified that (R. 44):
"Well, we "·ere just riding along the road.
E\·crytbing \\:IS wiing fine. Then we come to this
spot, something black laying there. There was
nothing traveli11:~ in front of us. But this black
objcd \ms there. "\11d my soil threw his arm up
agai11st rue to hold me back when he applied his
hrake rud hard a11d we hit some hard object.
(~,Did

way?

.n'u

~;<~c

this object

~-ourself

on the high-

,\. "Te were .i u-;t a matter of feet.
q, \\'hat

""ls

"~1c

appearance of iP

,\. You could1d tell what it was. Some dark
ob.ieet. . \ml I t lioug·ht it was like a tarpaulin or
.~omcthiBg. I do1t't know.

Q. Can you describe the color of this object
iu contrast with tlte color of the highway?
,\,\Veil. the objed was just pure black.
(~.

How about the highway1

A. The

hig·lnn1~·

seemC'd awful dark, too."

There was no evidence that the plaintiff saw or
should lune see11 the animal in time to have warned or
dniit a11ytliing at all. She tcstitied that when she first
0
aw the ohjc:d '"it was just :i matter of feet" before the

r
-·'

impact. Defendant has the burden of proof m1 a matter
of this kind. He did not sustaiu that burdell.
Defendant's conteutiou that the jury shoul<l 11
allowed to consider the fact that there were no seat belh
as contributory negligence is supported b~, nothing but
counsel's own wishful thinking. Defendallt ha., rited
no authorities to sustain this novel principle. Ile at·
tempts to tickle the imagination of this Honorable Court
into a burst of interesting new law. A person imited
to ride in a new Cadillac automobile should refuse to ride
in same unless General :Motors has seen fit to equip it
with seat belts. This is just another example of the
man~' untenable positions which characterize defendant's
brief.
J

THOMPSON CASE DISTINGUISHED

Defendant in his brief Las cited the recent l'tali
case of Thornpson v. Ford Motor Co.,
U.2d
. 295 i
P.2d 62, as being determinatiYe of the questiou as to
whether violation of the statute establishes negligence
per se or liability. The case at bar is distinguishable
from the 1.'hompson case, inasmuch as the statute here
involved specifically establishes liabilitr where a pers1111
is injured as a result of the statutor~' Yiolation. The
plaintiff in the case at bar is within the dass of persons
protected by the statute. In the 'Ph01npson case ..as
pointed out, in Mr. Justice Henriocl's dissent, the plwn·
ti.ff tl·as not within the class of persons under the profrt·
tion of the stai'.11.Je. In addition, there wa~ a serious 0rn·1
1

'.'. 1

tiou as to whether or not the truck was unattended. The
plaintiff claimed that it was not. There was also a serious
question as to whether or not plaintiff's injuries were
prnximatcly caused by the violation of the statute. Plaintiff has no argument with the fact that there are certain
1tatutes, Yiolatiou of which establishes negligence per se,
and which Yiolation can with a proper showing be exnised. Howe\-er, the statute in question is not one of
these statutes, inasmuch as it specifically imposes liability 011 the part of the violator. Defense counsel, in
his brief. has dreamed up some hypothetical situations
11hich he claims \\'ould make application of the doctrine
uf absolute liability uutenable. However, these hypothetical situations do uot contain the facts of the case at
bar. The solution of different cases with different problems lea\'es us still facing the problem now before the
, court. Let us discuss this problem and worry about light. ning, Hoods, and hurricanes when, as, and if they occur.
i Here the defendant was hauling cattle and a separation
of the tailgate from the side of the rack caused the cattle
lo fall u11to the highway. As was pointed out by Burdick, Law of Crime, knowledge is not an element of
proof in such a statute. The falling of the object from
lht truck eonstitutes the violation. Counsel for defend~nt thinks the humanitarian thing to do is to place the
burden of loss on the shoulders of an innocent victim
and give sympathetic relief to the hauler for profit who
rlropped his cow into the path of lawful travelers on the
l1ig'hlrny. H umanitaria11 indeed!
1

CONCLUSION
At common law drivers 011 a public highway mre
a duty of exercising onhuary care to keep their haulaue
from falling onto the highway an<l causing injurr ~o
travelers lawfully using same. The Utah Legish;ture
saw fit to pass a statute imposing a more stringent duty
on those who would use our highways to haul product1
and commodities. An innocent passenger suffered serere
permanent injury as a result of a black cow falling from
a truck onto the highway at night. Her case has been
tried before two juries. Each time, the matter was Yiewed
as some hybrid type of negligence action, contran· to
the unequiYocal language of the statute. The ease obri·
ously must be tried a third time because the jury incon·
sistently answered that there was no Yiolation of the
statute but that a violation of the statute proximately
caused plaintiff's injury. The trial court, recognizing
that the evidence undisputedly was that defendant's
eow fell onto the highway and caused plaintiff's injury
granted judgment N.O.Y. Because the jury refused
to award general damages e1·en though plaintiff hadsuf·
f ered a fractured back, it becomes necessary to try the
case again on the issue of damages.
The ruling of the trial court is just and fair. Our
statutory law must be honored just as our decisional
law must be honored.
"re respectfully submit that the trial court's ruling
should be sustained.
Respectfull~· submitted,

RAvVLINGS, "\\._.\LLACE, ROBERTS
&
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